



Study Guide UNSC



Topic A: The Libyan Peace Process
Topic B: The Kashmir Dispute

Aral Arbatlı

Word of Welcome

Honourable Delegates of the United Nations Security Council,

As your chairs, it is with great pleasure that we, Aral, welcome you to the SGMUN 2022 Conference in the United Nations Security Council (henceforth UNSC) Committee. As the MUN community around the world is starting to pick up pace again, conferences seem livelier than ever! It is time to rectify many fun experiences that couldn't happen or many interesting exchanges that never took place. One way or another, we will try to make your time in the UNSC truly unforgettable!

Peace might be the most important ingredient when it comes to sustaining the human civilization. It is complex, versatile yet endlessly demanding and never quite understood perfectly. Our choice of topics reflects how peace can have very different meanings around the world, depending on the context. Topic 1 will take you to North Africa, where the oil rich country of Libya seems to be slowly losing its few yet hard earned ounces of stability. Topic 2 will bring us to an ancient land, and to a dispute as ancient for our purposes: Kashmir. Both topics give you a chance to implement your best desires for peace, yet each has their own unique challenges to overcome. For both of the topics, we expect lively debates, ingenious proposals and substantial compromises.

We will do our best to help and guide you during the conference and before, and answer any questions you might have on the debate, the rules of procedure (henceforth RoPs), the position paper and the intricacies of the topics. We are ecstatic that you have chosen our committee, and we are eager to see the wonders you will create with your skills in diplomacy and statecraft.

Feel free to reach us for any reason during and before the conference, we would love nothing more than helping you out! Our contact information is indicated below:

Co-Chair Aral Arbatlı: aralunimail@gmail.com

Table of Content

WORD OF WELCOME.....	I
1. ABOUT THE CHAIRS.....	1
A. ARAL ARBATLI.....	1
2. ABOUT THE UNSC.....	2
3. THE LIBYAN PEACE PROCESS.....	3
A. WELCOME TO LIBYA.....	3
I. GEOGRAPHY.....	3
II.GENERAL HISTORY.....	4
B. THE GADDAFI REGIME AND THE FIRST LIBYAN CIVIL WAR.....	7
C. POST-GADDAFI LIBYA.....	9
I. THE EMERGENCE OF TWO RIVAL GOVERNMENTS.....	9
II.TAKE TWO - LEAD UP TO THE CURRENT SITUATION.....	11
D. THE EFFECTS OF THE SECOND LIBYAN CIVIL WAR AND THE PEACE PROCESS...12	
I. THE EFFECTS.....	12
II.THE PEACE PROCESS.....	13
E. PAST UNSC RESOLUTIONS ON LIBYA.....	15
F. RELEVANT QUESTIONS.....	16
4. THE KASHMIR DISPUTE.....	17
A. INTRODUCTION TO KASHMIR.....	17
B. HISTORY OF KASHMIR.....	17
I. EARLY HISTORY.....	17
II. THE END OF AN EMPIRE.....	18
III.KASHMIR POST-1947.....	19
C. RECENT ACTIONS AND UPDATES.....	20
D. PAST INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS.....	22
E. RELEVANT QUESTIONS.....	23
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	III
A. THE LIBYAN PEACE PROCESS.....	III
B. THE KASHMIR DISPUTE.....	VII

1. About the Chairs

Aral Arbatlı

Hello there!

I am Aral Berke Arbatlı, one of your co-chairs in the UNSC for SGMUN 2022. I am a Life-Sciences Engineering student from EPFL in the third year of Bachelor's. I am also an avid lover of history, politics, positive sciences, debating, but most importantly, MAPS! What does this mean? This means that in addition to the usual intricacies of international affairs, I also enjoy seeing how emerging technologies redefine economic and infrastructural norms and then reshuffle the cards in the geopolitical arena (usually in contrast to your poor law student who has to decide how to deal and regulate the cool stuff we come up with).

MUN is a lovely platform to exchange ideas and experiences to hone one's skills in debating and negotiating, and ultimately to cultivate one's mind. This year's theme „Finding Common Ground for Common Growth“ seems to fit this trend rather well. Finding common ground is the first step in reasoning with anyone, and without reasoning can we even agree on the basic pillars of our civilization? How can we aspire to develop our society even further, address the problems within, ensure our own growth and the ones around us?

I hope each and every one of you will show me new horizons in human reasoning, and use your mind and passion to wage peace through the hearts of humans, and upon the map of course. Wage peace and reason upon this committee of the UNSC, dear delegates, for peace and reason here will one day lead to compassion and common growth around the world.

2. About the UNSC

The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are (legally) obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorise the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council's first action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful means. The Council may:

1. Set forth principles for such an agreement;
2. Undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
3. Dispatch a mission;
4. Appoint special envoys; or
5. Request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute.

When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council's primary concern is to bring them to an end as soon as possible. In that case, the Council may:

1. Issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;
2. Dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.

Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including:

1. Economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans;
2. Severance of diplomatic relations;
3. Blockade;
4. Collective military action.

A chief concern is to focus action on those responsible for the policies or practices condemned by the international community, while minimising the impact of the measures taken on other parts of the population and economy.

3. The Libyan Peace Process


a. Welcome to Libya

i. Geography

Surrounded by Egypt to the East, Sudan in the Southeast, Chad and Niger in the South, Algeria to the West, Tunisia to the Northwest and the Mediterranean Sea to the North, Libya is an ancient land.

The harsh climate of the Sahara Desert dominating the southern highlands and with a lack of permanent rivers, the human settlement in Libya was dictated by what the seasonal rivers and the coastal highlands could offer.

This led to the emergence of three distinct populations over time, the historic regions of Tripolitania (Ṭarābulus, centred around the city of Tripoli) to the Northwest, Cyrenaica (Barqah, centred around the city of Benghazi) to the Northeast and Fezzan in the central Southwest.[2]



The topographic map of Libya, showing the Mediterranean Sea, Libya's neighbours and distinct bodies of highlands [1].


Tripolitania and Cyrenaica are the two main population centres of Libya, whereas Fezzan is mostly an arid desert. Despite the desert climate, some level of agriculture and animal husbandry is present in these regions. These activities however, only constitute 1% of the total Libyan territory respectively.

To the South, under the desert, lies a great reservoir of underground water. These aquifers have been utilised with wells and springs to water oases[3] and thus far play a crucial role for the survival of human settlements in the southern provinces. In fact, these aquifers are also the source of the Great Man-Made River.[4]

Yet the greatest underground wealth in Libya is oil. Petroleum was first discovered in Libya in 1956 near the Algerian border and is Libya's most important mineral resource. Subsequent finds have been mainly concentrated in onshore reserves located in the Sirte Basin. Libya's proven oil reserves represent a large part of Africa's total reserves and about 3 percent of the world's total reserves. Libyan crude oil is low in sulphur content and therefore causes less corrosion and less pollution than most crude oils, which has made it popular in countries that have imposed stringent emissions standards. The oil deposits are thought to contain natural gas as well.[5]



The administrative provinces of Libya regrouped into the three historical provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. Note that the historical region of Cyrenaica is the coastal part of the wider region indicated in the map. [6]



The map of population density in Libya, with a zoom in on the two major centres, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Note that the Tripolitanian urban development forms a continuum with the urban development in southern Tunisian coastline, and vice-versa with Cyrenaica and the Egyptian coastline. [7]

ii. General History

Libya, funnily enough, is not necessarily meant to exist. The two urban centres of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania had separate allegiances and were the continuations of bigger urban centres in Egypt and Tunisia. Yet, through the course of history they ended up in the same country. This is the story of how these two centres came together.

From the Antiquity, till the end of the local Muslim Dynasties

Berbers have inhabited central north Africa since ancient times, but the region has been settled and ruled by Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, and Vandals [8]. Libya is no exception to this trend.

After the Arabs completed the conquest of Eastern Roman Egypt in 642, they started to raid the Berber (Amazigh) territory to its west, which they called Bilād al-Maghrīb (“Lands of the West”) or simply the Maghrīb. In 705 this region became a province of the Muslim empire then ruled from Damascus by the Umayyad caliphs (661–750).[9]

The region’s indigenous Christian communities, which before the Arab conquest had constituted an important part of the Christian world, nearly ceased to exist. The Islamization of the Berbers was a consequence of the Arab conquest, although they were neither forcibly converted to Islam nor systematically missionized by their conquerors.



The map of provinces within the Roman Empire in 117 AD. Tripolitania (around Leptis Magna) is under Africa Proconsularis, while Cyrenaica forms its own province with Crete, Cyrenaica et Creta. Note the presence of Fezzan with its Latin name “Phazania” [18]

Rather, the conversion happened was because Islamic teachings became an ideology through which the Berbers justified both their rebellion against the caliphs and their support of rulers who rejected caliphal authority (see below), Islam gained wide appeal and spread rapidly among these fiercely independent peoples.[9]

The Muslim Khārijite sect exploited this revolutionary potential in their struggle against Umayyad rule. Khārijite doctrine apparently appealed to the Berbers because it rejected the Arab monopoly on political leadership of the Muslim community, stressed piety and learning as the main qualifications of the head of the community, and sanctioned rebellion against the head when he acted unjustly. This would characterise a series of Kharijite rebellions in the Maghreb against Damascus. [10]

After the fall of the Umayyads to the Abbasids, the first local dynasty, the Fihrids, would emerge in 747, Kai-rouan, Tunisia. The dominance of the region then switched to the Kharijites, and specifically the Ibadiyya sect, before the Abbasids restored the Caliph's authority over the region.

The first dynasty to truly break the Abbasid rule would be the Arab speaking Aghlabids. Coming from an army background, the dynasty would usurp the wilayah of Ifriqiyyah (Province of Africa), yet acknowledge the nominal suzerainty of the Abbasid Caliph over the region. This new state based in Tunisia also had control over Tripolitania, as the region was a part of the province.

Political life in the Aghlabid state reflected the rulers' constant fear that their Arab troops would rebel and preoccupation with the need to allay the grievances of the religious scholars. The Hanafi (the Islamic school of jurisprudence mostly accepted by the Abbasid Caliph) Aghlabid rulers tried to placate the Mālikī (the most prominent Islamic school of jurisprudence in the region at the time, stricter than the Hanafi school) scholars by appointing many of them to the office of qādī ("judge") and by instituting a program of sacred building construction. This dynasty would even briefly rule over Sicily.[11]

The grievances that the inhabitants of Ifrīqiyyah harboured against Aghlabid rule were transformed into a revolutionary movement by the Ismā'īliyyah, an extremist branch of the Shī'ite sect. The resulting Shiite Fatimid Caliphate would later go onto conquering Egypt from the Ikshids, putting Tripolitania and Cyrenaica under the same local polity for the first time.

The Fatimids would fall to the Zirids in Tunisia and to the famous Ayyubids in Egypt. The Berber Almoravid and Almohad dynasties of Morocco would then dominate over the region whose fragmentation would leave Tripolitania in the hands of another Tunisian dynasty by the name of the Hafids.[12]

From the Abbasids to the Almoravids, a religiously motivated legalistic argument to legitimise the right to rule was the general practice. Yet, this did not find widespread acceptance in the general populace, hence the relatively short length of the individual dynasties. From the end of the Almohad rule, fractured state politics was the norm. The Berber tribes would still play an important role in each state, while Sufism was introduced to the region as early as the 12th Century. The fractured nature of the polities made resistance against the Iberian Christian invasions after 1500 considerably difficult.[13]

The Ottoman Rule

The Ottoman Empire conquered Egypt in 1517 (which included Cyrenaica). Following that, Algeria, Tunisia and Tripolitania would be acquired by the Ottomans one by one. Each of these states followed a similar pattern in their relationship with the Sublime Porte in Constantinople. All of them rebelled against and ejected the governors sent from Constantinople. [14]

In Algeria, the local troops would establish a quasi military republic and would engage in extensive piracy. Tunisia would follow a similar path, but would then diverge and power would be consolidated under the office of the Bey, a low ranking Ottoman title indicating local rule. The Husaynid dynasty, the dynasty that seized power through the office of the Bey, would maintain power in Tunisia until 1957.

In Tripolitania, the Ottoman victory over the Knights of Malta led to conquest of the region, bringing Tripolitania and Cyrenaica under the same polity again. Yet, Ottoman Tripolitania would be a separate entity of its own, under the Turkish Karamanli dynasty. The Karamanlis would engage in piracy as well, and would fall in 1835 due to a British supported tribal revolt. This would lead to Constantinople asserting direct rule once again. [15]

After the Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912), Italy took over the last Ottoman holdings in North Africa and colonised Libya [16].


Italian Colonisation & The Sanussiyah

During the Italian colonisation, an emergent Senussi Order, a religious order founded in 1837 and based in Cyrenaica, advocating for a return to old Islamic thought and way of life, dominated the struggle against the Italian and French colonial ambitions, and acted as a unifying force for the three provinces [17]. The Italians would not be able to establish control over the Libyan Desert for nearly thirty years due to the Senussis.

The Italian colonisation saw the introduction of new roads, towns and agricultural colonies for new Italian settlers. The demographic colonisation was such that 1/5th of the entire Libyan population were Italians during the Fascist rule in Italy. However, most of the Italians left after the war, and most of the infrastructure left by the Italians degraded, except in Tripoli [19].

Libya declared independence as the United Kingdom of Libya in 1951, under King Idris [20], who also happened to be the head of the Senussi Order. During his reign, he tried to unify the three provinces, and established a base of power in Cyrenaica (as the traditional base of the Senussi Order). His government was supported by the conservative Senussi tribesmen, and wealthy urban townsmen. The government led by Idris I had an overall pro-Western stance in foreign affairs [21].

In 1959, the discovery of oil in Libya led to a profound transition in Libya. The foreign aid dependent country suddenly became a petroleum-rich monarchy. This would lead to a sharp increase in government services, number of infrastructure projects and standard of living, yet also increase resentment at the concentration of the oil wealth in the hands of the King [22] [23].



Map of the North African Muslim Dynasties in the 15th Century. Note that the Tunisian Hafsid Dynasty controls Tripolitania, while the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt rules of Cyrenaica. [25]



The holdings of the Senussi Order at their highest extent. Note how the total area of Senussi influence roughly corresponds to the modern borders of Libya [26].

b. The Gaddafi Regime and the First Libyan Civil War

The Gaddafi Regime

Despite increasing life standards thanks to the petroleum reserves, many of the younger army officers and members of the growing urban middle class resented Idris's socially conservative policies and his aloofness from the growing currents of Arab nationalism. In September 1969, while Idris was at a Turkish spa for medical treatment, the army, led by Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi, overthrew the government [24]. Gaddafi was named commander in chief of the armed forces and chairman of Libya's new governing body, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) [27].

Gaddafi would rule Libya for the next forty-two years. His reign was initially marked with reforms such as free and compulsory education for both sexes, free healthcare and an endeavour for housing for all [28]. His government followed a pan-Arab, pro-Soviet and anti-imperialist stance in foreign politics, and as such financed a broad spectrum of groups worldwide that sought revolutionary objectives of their own, including the Black Panthers, the Nation of Islam in the United States, and the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland [29].

From 1974 onward Gaddafi espoused a form of Islamic socialism as expressed in The Green Book. This combined the nationalisation of many economic sectors with a brand of populist government ostensibly operating through people's congresses, labour unions, and other mass organisations [30]. This view would be embedded in the reformed Libyan state, the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. This was coupled with increased domestic repression, with student protesters being hanged in Benghazi during 1976 protests [32].



Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan head-of-state for 42 years. Photograph taken during the 12th African Union Summit in 2008 [31]

Gaddafi's reign also saw infrastructure projects of massive scale, such as the Great Man-Made River. The world's largest irrigation system [33] (the Libyan government proudly proclaimed it "the Eighth Wonder of the World"), the project has supplied much-needed irrigation and drinking water to populous cities and farming areas in Libya's north since 1991 [34].

Due to Gaddafi's unconventional foreign policy, the assassinations of Libyan émigré individuals, alleged affiliation to terror attacks in Europe and the destruction of an airliner above Scotland; Libya was put under sanctions by the UN and the USA in 1988, and was subjected to an air strike in 1986 by American warplanes.[35] The sanctions were lifted (in 2003) after Gaddafi turned over the perpetrators of the airliner bombing were handed off to the international authorities and a commitment to end the Libyan unconventional weapons programme [36]. The country's attempt at rehabilitation in the international community culminated in Gaddafi's tenure as the chairman of the African Union, though his unconventional attempt at remaining as chairman for more than one year was rejected [37]. Gaddafi also delivered a notorious speech to the UNGA in 2009, generating high levels of controversy [38].

The First Libyan Civil War

In 2011, as the Arab Spring raged in Egypt and Tunisia, a series of protests began in Benghazi. What started as a protest against a delay in housing projects soon turned into anti-government protests [39]. As the Gaddafi regime tried to violently suppress the protests, the protests turned into a civil war.

On February 27th a rival government, named the National Transition Council (NTC) was established in Benghazi. It would act as the political face of the revolution in Libya. [40]

Meanwhile, Gaddafi claimed that the opposition had been directed by al-Qaeda and that the protesters had been under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs. He urged his supporters to defend him by fighting protesters. [41]

As the opposition forces under the NTC consolidated in Cyrenaica and started to move west towards Tripoli, Gaddafi implemented a scorched earth-policy. Using death squads, he started a systematic elimination of any possible dissenters in Tripoli and the surrounding regions [42]. Territorial loss was coupled with the resignation of key government ministers, further weakening the regime. [43]

The UN Security Council formally adopted the UNSC Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, calling for a cease-fire, instituting a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace, strengthening the existing weapons embargo and freezing the assets of top Libyan officials, such as Gaddafi. Resolution 1973 would also act as the legal basis of the foreign military intervention in Libya, which took the form of a NATO and US lead enforcement of the no-fly zone and a naval blockade, culminating in the bombing of Tripoli towards the late phase of the conflict.[44]

The rebel fighters achieved a major symbolic victory on August 23 when they captured the Bāb al-'Azīziyyah compound, Gaddafi's headquarters in Tripoli. Jubilant crowds ransacked the compound, destroying symbols of the Gaddafi regime. Gaddafi himself was killed in Sirte on October 20 as rebel forces took control of the city, one of the last remaining loyalist strongholds. [45]

By the end of the conflict, the majority of the international community had recognised the NTC as the sole sovereign representative of Libya, and the NTC had occupied the UN seat of Libya. [46]





The map of the First Libyan Civil War (2011-2012). The gradual march towards Tripoli and then the interior shown. ■ Held by anti-Gaddafi forces by 1 March (Checkered: Lost before UN intervention) ■ Contested areas between March and August ■ Rebel western coastal offensive in August ■ Rebel gains by 1 October ■ Last loyalist pockets. [47]

c. Post - Gaddafi Libya

The civil war witnessed utter cruelty and human misery. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting reported that the International Criminal Court estimated 10,000 had been killed [48].

Political scientist Riadh Sidaoui suggested in October 2011 that Gaddafi „has created a great void for his exercise of power: there is no institution, no army, no electoral tradition in the country“, and as a result, the period of transition would be difficult in Libya. [49]



The Senussi Monarchy era flag of Libya, revived by the NTC led rebels as the new national flag during the First Libyan Civil War. [50]

i. The Emergence of Two Rival Governments

General National Congress VS House of Representatives

The NTC officially dissolved itself on 8 August 2012, and formally relinquished power to the General National Congress (GNC), a legislative body of 200 seats elected a month ago on 7 July 2012 [51]. This transfer was described as “the first peaceful transition of power in modern Libyan history”. [52]

The General National Congress, led by Mohammed Ali Salim, was tasked with drafting a new permanent and democratic constitution for Libya. The body was given an 18-month deadline for this task. When the deadline came and went with the constitution being far from complete, the General National Congress voted to dissolve itself in favour of a new elected body, the House of the Representatives (HoR) [53].

The election also served another purpose. By 2014, the General National Congress was divided between two political forces that came out dominant from the 2012 elections: the National Forces Alliance, a secular party and the holder of the highest number of seats, and the Islamist Libyan Justice and Construction Party [54]. On the way to 2014, a notable act of the General National Congress would be to accept instituting the Sharia Law [55].

A month later after the inauguration of the General National Congress, armed militia elements pertaining to the Al-Qaeda affiliated Ansar Al-Sharia stormed the US Consulate in Benghazi, and murdered the US Ambassador Christopher Stevens. This act, coupled with the brief kidnapping of the Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and oil infrastructure sabotages to extract concessions from the central government finally led to the infamous Operation Dignity by the Libyan National Army (Libyan National Army) under the command of General Khalifah Haftar against the armed Islamist forces in Eastern Libya [56]. The elections, it was hoped, would serve to calm down the first act of violence in the new civil war.

The elections had a voter turnout of less than 20%, and the Islamist parties openly rejected the legitimacy of the elections. The General National Congress (more precisely an un-elected minority of the pre-election General National Congress), instead of being dissolved as it was technically supposed to after the end of its mandate, instead remained and coalesced under the National Salvation Government (NSG). This happened with the help of armed Islamist groups such as Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room and the Libya Shield Force [57] [58].

Meanwhile, the HoR, itself declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court nominated by the new General National Congress, would retreat to Tobruk and operate under Haftar's protection, who has had himself decried the General National Congress as dominated by Islamists. [59]

As two rival governments emerged, the apparatus of state began to fracture itself, and institutions started to align with differing governments. While the National Oil Company and the Central Bank remained under the nominal control of the NSG, the HoR would take control over the eastern branches of these entities. [60]

The resulting chaos also led to the emergence of the considerably smaller third faction: the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, with militias coming from Syria and Iraq even capturing the city of Sirte. The 2nd Civil War in Libya would rage between the two main factions of Tripoli and Tobruk (and other minor factions) against each other, and would see skirmishes and clashes in Benghazi, Tripoli, Sirte and many more Libyan citizens.

The Government of National Accord

In December 2015 delegates from Libya's rival factions signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) a UN-brokered power-sharing agreement establishing a Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by a prime minister and a nine-member presidency council drawn from constituencies and factions throughout the country. [62]

While initially looking promising, cracks began showing up almost immediately. While the Government of National Salvation stepped down in the favour of the GNA led by Prime Minister Al-Sarraj, some of its affiliated elements showed resistance. Meanwhile the HoR in Tobruk, intended to be kept as the legislature under name of the High Council of State, initially approved the Libyan Political Agreement (also known as the Shirkat Agreement), yet rejected the list of ministers proposed by the Presidency Council [63]. On 17 December 2017, General Haftar declared the Libyan Political Agreement void. [64]

Between 2016 and 2018, while the rival governments in Tripoli and Tobruk didn't engage each other directly, they did try to achieve success at the expense of the other. The HoR Government would capture Benghazi [65] while Sirte was liberated from Islamic State of Iraq and Levant by the GNA [66]. Already in 2017, both sides were courting Russian assistance in the conflict, with meetings in a Russian aircraft carrier and in Moscow respectively [67][68]. In 2018 various militias in Tripoli started a skirmish inside the city, during which Islamic State of Iraq and Levant also conducted an attack against the National Oil Company [69].

Interestingly, the matter of oil was a basis of agreement between the two governments. While the Libyan National Army owned all the oil ports by 2018, the international community stated a commitment to only trade with the Tripoli branch of the National Oil Company. After reaching an understanding in an international conference in Palermo, the HoR government agreed to the operations of the GNA's National Oil Company in the oil ports in Cyrenaica. A level of cooperation would be maintained until 2019. [70]

In 2019, the 14 month long Western Libya Offensive was launched by Haftar with the hopes of capturing Tripoli. The major clash between the two government's forces saw the HoR aligned Libyan National Army reaching the outskirts of Tripoli. While the GNA would repel the Libyan National Army attacks with Turkish assistance, the Libyan National Army would nevertheless capture Sirte. On 12 January 2020, through Turkish and Russian diplomatic pressure, a ceasefire was agreed upon. [71]

A conference in Berlin on January 19 was meant to solidify the ceasefire, yet it was breached in mere days. Fighting continued as GNA pushed the Libyan National Army further, and lines stabilised in Sirte [71]. Egypt threatened military intervention if the GNA forces would capture Sirte. [72]

Through diplomatic efforts, a permanent ceasefire was reached by 23 October 2020. [73]

ii. Take Two - Lead up to the Current Situation

Government of National Unity

Based on the recommendations in January 2021 from the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Geneva, a gathering of local Libyan powerbrokers, a roadmap was established for the future of Libya [74]. It was this roadmap that would lead to the Government of National Unity (GNU), a new government that would carry on the international recognition of the GNA and was tasked with overseeing the planned elections. [76]



The emblem of the Government of National Unity [75]


The GNU under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah was approved in a joint session of the rival parliaments, and set a deadline in December 2021 for the elections. Yet the deadline was not met [77], and even before that, the HoR passed a vote of no-confidence against the GNU. [78]

The international community urged for the mandate of the GNU to be extended, yet the HoR in Tobruk considered Dbeibah's term to be over and elected Fathi Bashagha (the Interior Minister of the previous GNA) as Prime Minister and passed confidence to his Government of National Stability (GNS) on 10 February 2022. Dbeibah, however, refused to concede his post as Prime Minister until elections could be held. [79]

As a failed attempt at a takeover in Tripoli by Bashagha on 17 May 2022, a series of clashes in Tripoli would take place between the supporters of the two rival governments. [80]

Since then, the much expected presidential and legislative elections have been postponed multiple times, and still haven't been held (as of September 2022) [81]. The dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs has led to violence, with the building of the HoR being burned down on 2 July 2022 by protesters in Tobruk [82]. On 28 August 2022, another series of clashes in Tripoli led the UN to call for a stop to the violence. [83]

With the election date uncertain, and the story of two rival governments, the GNU in Tripoli and the GNS in Tobruk, is continuing on. Indeed, with the two sides with their two geographical power bases unable to dominate each other, the previously established major ceasefire seems to be the only thing keeping further violence away. For now.



Map of the Military situation in Libya on 11 June 2020: Under the control of the House of Representatives in Tobruk and the Libyan National Army Under the control of the Government of National Accord and the Libya Shield Force Under the control of the National Salvation Government Controlled by local forces Controlled by Tuareg forces [84]

d. The Effects of the Second Libyan Civil War and the Peace Process

i. The Effects

Humanitarian

While establishing an accurate full body count is difficult, 14,882+ people are estimated to be killed [85][86] [87][88][89], and approximately a third of the population is estimated to have fled to Tunisia [90]. 800,000 of the two million Egyptian labour force in the country would also go back to Egypt [91].

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 45,600 refugees and asylum seekers were registered in Libya in 2019 [92]. This number is coupled with the World Food Programme estimation of 435,000 people being forcibly displaced [93]. Children in Libya suffered from malnutrition during the war, in addition to the constant threat of death. [94][95]

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi's son) for crimes against humanity carried out under the Gaddafi regime [110]; and Mahmoud al-Werfalli, a Libyan general under the Tobruk aligned Libyan National Army, for crimes against humanity committed in 2016 [111]. Al-Werfalli was later killed, yet al-Islam Gaddafi is currently a presidential candidate in Libya, and for the purposes of ICC, at large as he enjoys immunity in Tobruk.

Economic

The Libyan economy is largely dependent on oil, so much so it represented 48% of all of its exports in 2016 [96], and it has the world's 9th largest reserves at 48 billion barrels [97]. During the First Civil War, oil production took the worst hit in its history, recovered until 2014 and took a major hit again, from which it has been recovering ever since [98]. On 31 July 2022, the oil production was reported to have recovered to pre-blockade levels (not to be confused with the pre civil war levels), with a 1.2m b/d [99].

The Libyan civil wars led to frequent disruptions of the oil exports, leading to decline in the quality of life. This was due to the fact that many militia factions carried out attacks to the oil infrastructure to cut off supply to rival factions or to hold the flow of oil hostage. These blackmail cuts were also applied in other forms of infrastructure, such as an attack on the control centre of the Great Man-Made River, stopping the flow of water to Tripoli (an act condemned by the UN) [100]

Geopolitical

The Second Libyan Civil War severely called the effectiveness of the UN in question. With the summits in Shrikat, Palermo and Berlin consistently either failing or not being enough in creating a lasting solution, the cherry on top was the regular and blatant breaches of the arms embargo by external actors such as Russia, Turkey, Egypt and the UAE. [101]

Yet the chaos of the civil war and the duality of power in Libya affected geopolitical currents in other ways as well. France and Italy, two EU member states, found themselves supporting opposing sides in the Libyan conflict [102]. Turkey and Russia had waged a proxy war in Libya just as they did in Syria [103], and Turkey even signed a maritime deal with the GNA to delimit the two country's Exclusive Economic Zone claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, in contradiction with the UNCLOS [104] (the treaty was then declared null by a Libyan court [105]).

ii. The Peace Process

The Salamé Three-Point Plan

On 29 July 2019, the head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Ghassan Salamé proposed a three-point peace process in his speech to the UNSC. Concretely, the three points were as follows: Ceasefire, Stopping of international arms flow into Libya, and intra-Libyan negotiations on Libya's future [106]. Essentially, what was hoped was that violence would end, international influence would be mitigated and Libyans would decide on their future on their own.

Salamé would resign from his post in March 2020, due to the various international actors not abiding by the arms embargo and failing to support the peace process in a meaningful way [107]. Yet his three-point plan still acts as the backbone of the current peace efforts.

Point 1: Ceasefires

The ceasefire on Eid al-Adha during mid-August 2019 and the ceasefire on 12 January 2020 through Turkish and Russian diplomatic pressure were attempts at achieving the first step of the three-point plan. Yet the UNSMIL recorded 110 violations of the 12 January ceasefire, and it wouldn't last [108]. Yet on 23 October 2020, the permanent ceasefire that is in effect to this day would be achieved.

Point 2: Arms Embargo

An international conference in Berlin was held on 19 January 2020 with representatives from the US, Russia, UK, France, the People's Republic of China, Italy, the UAE, Turkey, the Republic of Congo, Egypt, Algeria, and of the UN, the EU, the AU and the Arab League; with Al-Sarraj and Haftar also joining [109]. While the conference covered many topics, the major one was to agree upon a commitment by relevant international actors to uphold the 2011 arms embargo.

The later reports by the Libyan Panel of Experts and a confidential report to the UNSC would indicate a continued violation of the arms embargo for the duration of the armed conflict.

Point 3: Intra-Libyan Negotiations

The process started by the UNSMIL foresaw three tracks for the Intra-Libyan negotiations: The economic, military and political tracks.

The economic track has focused on mitigating the oil exports, decentralisation and the degradation of Libyan institutions (as nearly each centralised economic and financial institution split in two), the banking crisis and the reconstruction of Libya after the conflict. It involved the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank and Stephanie Williams of UNSMIL.

The military track was aimed at expelling foreign armed combatants, counterterrorism, hostage exchanges and possibly the organisation and the reconstitution of a future united Libyan army (DDR: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration). To this end, the UNSMIL had proposed a 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission with 5 military representatives from Tripoli and 5 from Tobruk. The JMC was the body that supervised the hostage exchange after the 23 October 2020 permanent ceasefire.

The political track concentrated on negotiations between the rival parliaments of HoR and the High Council of State (HCS), and saw a series of meetings between the representatives of each body. It also saw the LPDF talks and the proposal for the GNU. The members of the LPDF would declare themselves ineligible for any future political power.

Legacy

The Salamé three-point plan has been the backbone of the peace efforts in Libya. Yet, its full implementation seems to be challenging, especially the third point on the intra-Libyan negotiations. While it may prove demanding to fulfil, the Salamé plan so far is the only concrete action plan. While the delegates are free to follow it, modify it or abandon it, the precedent they set on their position in regards to the Salamé plan might impact how the UNSC will approach similar civil conflicts and failing state cohesion in the future.

e. Past UNSC Resolutions on Libya

Among many others, here are some UNSC resolutions concerning Libya that helped shape the response of the international community towards this issue over the years [112]:

- 17 MARCH 2011 - S/RES/1973

This resolution was adopted with ten votes and five abstentions and authorised all necessary measures—excluding an occupation force—to protect civilians in Libya and enforce the arms embargo, imposed a no-fly zone, strengthened the sanctions regime, and established a panel of experts.

- 16 SEPTEMBER 2011 - S/RES/2009

This resolution authorised the deployment of UNSMIL and partially lifted sanctions.

- 27 OCTOBER 2011 - S/RES/2016

This resolution lifted the no-fly zone and the provisions for the use of force for the protection of civilians.

- 12 MARCH 2012 - S/RES/2040

This resolution extended the mandate of UNSMIL and the Panel of Experts by 12 months, with a requirement to review and adjust the mandate within six months.

- 27 AUGUST 2014 - S/RES/2174

This was a resolution imposing sanctions on individuals and entities obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition and tightening the arms embargo.

- 5 MARCH 2015 - S/RES/2208

This was a resolution on a technical rollover of UNSMIL as well as on the measures on vessels transporting crude oil illicitly exported from Libya until 31 March.

- 27 MARCH 2015 - S/RES/2214

This was a resolution that focused on counter-terrorism efforts.

- 23 DECEMBER 2015 - S/RES/2259

The Council welcomed the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement.

- 14 JUNE 2016 - S/RES/2292

This was a resolution providing a one year authorisation for member states to inspect, in the high seas off the coast of Libya, vessels bound to or from Libya.

- 11 FEBRUARY 2020 - S/RES/2509

This renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee until 15 May 2021 as well as the measures related to the illicit export from Libya of petroleum until 30 April 2021.

- 12 FEBRUARY 2020 - S/RES/2510

This resolution endorsed the conclusions of the Berlin Conference on Libya.

- 16 APRIL 2021 - S/RES/2570

In this resolution, the Council strongly urges member states to withdraw “all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without delay”.

- 28 JULY 2022 - S/RES/2647

This resolution extended UNSMIL’s mandate until 31 October 2022.

f. Relevant Questions

The following questions posed should be some of the different considerations you should have as a delegate prior to the conference, in informing your position paper, and, ultimately, your contributions within the committee:

- Where did/does your country stand in terms of Libya? What are your long/short term objectives and outcomes you wish to see?
- Which government do you see as the most legitimate one? Which government has the most longevity? What is the difference?
- Has your country been a relevant actor in Libya? Has it supported any of the sides throughout the post-Gaddafi era crisis? If so, which side(s) and why? How does that inform your current position?
- What is your country's position on the arms embargo? How would you best ensure that the 2011 arms embargo is well respected and abided by? Rather, do you actually want that?*
- How do you wish to ensure the current ceasefire does not degrade into yet another series of wide-scale armed conflicts? Rather, do you actually want that?*
- How would you try to stop the GNU and the GNS from reiterating the woes of rival dual governments? What would be your ideal power-sharing solution for Libya?
- Should it be Libyans who decide on their own future political settlement? To what extent? What is the role that the UNSC and the international community are supposed to play?
- What is your country's vision for the reunification of the splintered national institutions?
- Does your country judge the upcoming presidential and legislative elections crucial? Why? Is it enough by itself? What would be best to support it further?

*Chair's note: For the study guide, when expressing controversial positions, openly challenging the UNSC mandates or the general desire for peace is not advised. Rather insinuating distaste with the current practices and pointing out inefficiencies might be better ways to insinuate your position.

4. The Kashmir Dispute

a. Introduction to Kashmir

The region of Kashmir and Jammu, henceforth simply referred to as Kashmir, is found in the northern edge of the Indian subcontinent. The region lies in the Himalayas and is, therefore, largely mountainous [1]. The control of the region is now divided between the Republic of India (hereinafter India), the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (henceforth Pakistan), and, to a lesser degree, the People's Republic of China (henceforth PRC) as can be seen in the map [2]. The division of Kashmir by three countries is made more contentious considering that they frequently fight over the disputed territories and are armed with nuclear weapons [3].



Kashmir territories profile [4]


The people of the region, moreover, are divided; the divisions include various ethnicities, language groups, and religions. Overall, the region is dominated by Muslims although East Jammu is largely Hindu and the sparsely populated region of Ladakh is mostly Tibetan [5]. Kashmir is an important region for both Hindus and Muslims as it is the home to multiple religious and cultural centres for both the sects.

b. History of Kashmir

i. Early History

The mountainous topography of Kashmir meant that much of the region proved challenging, if not impossible, to govern. Furthermore, the region has been in varied hands over the years. Between the 9th and 12th centuries, the region of Kashmir became a prominent centre for Hindus [6]. In the 13th century, the region fell under the rule of Muslims that lasted until it was annexed by Sikhs in 1819 and, thereafter, taken over by the Dogra Kingdom, who were Muslims, that became a princely state within the soon-to-be formed British Raj in 1858 [7].

The British rule over India, known as the British Raj, was a complicated patchwork consisting predominantly of territories in the Indian subcontinent under direct rule and states, typically known as ‘princely states’, with treaties to the British that relinquished varying degrees of autonomy. This contraction came about in the 1850s with the First Indian Independence War with the main result being large parts of the country falling under direct British rule [8]. One third of India, consisting of 550 princely states, was never under formal British rule. This is best seen with the following map.



Pre-partition map of India before 1947 [9]

ii. The End of An Empire

Whilst Kashmir fell under British rule, the vagueness of Kashmir’s borders and the various difficulties in maintaining control over the regions were of minor consequence [10]. The British rule over the Indian subcontinent, more importantly, quickly unravelled in the 1940s as a consequence of a number of short and long term events and trends [11]. This came to a head in 1947 when the British quickly withdrew from the subcontinent [12]. The following map provides a simplified overview of the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent in 1947.



Partition of India in August 1947 [13]

Britain had historically had separate electorates for Muslim citizens and reserved some political seats specifically for Muslims; that not only hemmed Muslims into a minority status, but fueled a growing Muslim separatist movement. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a politician who headed up India's Muslim League, began demanding a separate nation for India's Muslim population. Jinnah said in 1945 [14], "It is high time that the British Government applied their mind definitely to the division of India and the establishment of Pakistan and Hindustan [i.e. the Republic of India], which means freedom for both." Generally speaking, the subcontinent would be divided into two countries. India would be a Hindu-dominated but also secular country whereas Pakistan would be a muslim state in the north west and north east of the Indian subcontinent; the latter, Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), is now an independent country [15]. To complicate this, the aforementioned 550 princely states were free to decide which country they would wish to join or seek to become independent.

The ruler of Kashmir initially sought to have his country become independent but was forced to seek to join India when Western Kashmiri muslims and Pashtun tribesmen, from the regions of modern-day Pakistan and Afghanistan, sought to prevent Kashmir from joining India. The ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, signed the 'Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union' which handed over Kashmir control to the newly formed India [16]. According to Britannica's authors for Kashmir, "This was the signal for intervention both by Pakistan, which considered the state to be a natural extension of Pakistan, and by India, which intended to confirm the act of accession." Similar transgressions of the instruments of accessions took place by India where, for example, Hyderabad and Junagadh were annexed into India against the wishes and actions of their rulers [17].

The situation in Kashmir was much more complicated due to the strife going-on in the Indian subcontinent. The suddenness of partitioning and long-term policies and trends boiled over into mass-migration and fighting that left millions dead or uprooted [18]. The partition and fighting over Kashmir, therefore, pushed Pakistan and India into a longstanding border dispute and rivalry [19].

iii. Kashmir Post-1947

The accession of Kashmir into India pushed India to airlift troops into defend Kashmir against the Pashtun invasion and quell the Kashmiri muslim uprising. Seeing the Indian troops as a threat and Kashmir as a natural extension of its borders, Pakistani forces sought to intervene which, in turn, resulted in a war between the two newly formed countries [20]. The war lasted between 1947 and 1948 wherein India approached the newly for-

med United Nations (UN) to intervene [21]. The UN's intervention brought about a ceasefire, divided Kashmir between the two countries with the borders being the ceasefire lines of control, and the promise of a plebiscite that would allow the Kashmiri people to decide for themselves [22]. The plebiscite has not yet happened as the two countries have failed to agree on the demilitarisation of the region [23].

The dispute soon became even more complicated as the PRC invaded India in 1962. The PRC, too, had long-standing border disputes with India as a result of the British colonial past although these disputes were fairly inconsequential in the direct aftermath of Indian independence until the PRC's invasion of Tibet in 1951 and the Tibetan uprising of 1959 considering the close ties India had with Tibet [24]. India and Pakistan's alliances at the time and to date have been malleable. The War of 1962, for instance, saw India receiving military support from the USSR and the US although the latter also provided development aid [25]. Whilst Pakistan enjoyed good relations with the west, its recent alignment with the PRC and other acts saw Western support of it fade [26]. Pakistan, moreover, also ceded land to the PRC after the war, specifically the Trans Karakoram Tract [27]. The war also pushed India to develop nuclear weapons which pushed Pakistan to develop its own weapons and raised the stakes over the Kashmir dispute [28].

In 1965, conflict between Pakistan and India as the former tried to capture the whole state but ultimately grounded into a stalemate [29]. India 'internationalised' the conflict by calling upon the UN to intervene, it resulted in an arms embargo on both countries but was more keenly felt in Pakistan with the relatively weaker military, which brought a ceasefire two days later and de-escalation talks [30].

The end of the 20th century brought about hopes of peace and reconciliation between Pakistan and India with the two actively engaged with each other diplomatically and sought to enable connections between their peoples. The most notable attempt in this regard was the Delhi-Lahore Bus (Diplomacy) wherein a bus connection between the two major cities of each country, namely Delhi and Lahore, was established [31]. The Indian Prime Minister was invited to ride the inaugural ride of the bus and, in Pakistan, the two countries signed a declaration that released civilian and fisherman detainees, renewed sport contests, and institutionalised talks regarding matters of mutual concern [32]. These leaps in relations were largely caused by international pressure, particularly from US President Bill Clinton who praised both Prime Ministers for the Lahore Declaration of February 1999 [33] saying that, "I commend the two Prime Ministers for demonstrating courage and leadership by coming together and addressing difficult issues that have long divided their countries."

This spirit and events brought about short-lived improvements. India, for example, soon discovered that Pakistan forces had the 'Line of Control' and infiltrated Indian administered Kashmir in 1999 soon after the signing of the Lahore Declaration [34]. The Pakistani forces infiltrated the Indian region by posing as Kashmiri militants through documents, prisoners, and later official statements from Pakistan showed them to be regulars. The Delhi-Lahore bus connection stopped for two years in 2001 after Pakistani-raised terrorist groups attacked the Indian Parliament [35]. The bus connection has, too, become suspended after India revoked its administered region of Kashmir of its special status [36].

c. Recent Actions and updates

On the 5th of August 2019, India revoked that seven-decade-long privileged status as the governing party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), had promised in its 2019 election manifesto and long called for its abolishment [37]. Telephone networks and the internet were cut off in the days leading up to the presidential order was announced, public gatherings were banned, and tens of thousands of troops were sent in whilst tourists were told to leave Kashmir under warnings of a terror threat [38]. Indian-administered Kashmir has held a special position within the country historically due to Article 370 of the Indian constitution which gave the region significant autonomy, including its own constitution, a separate flag, and independence over all matters except

foreign affairs, defence, and communications [39]. With Indian-administered Kashmir's special status repealed in 2019, people from the rest of India would have the right to acquire property in Kashmir and settle there permanently which Kashmiris fear would lead to a demographic transformation of the region from majority-Muslim to majority-Hindu [40]. The repealing of Article 370 is also done on questionable legal grounds as the federal move requires the state government's agreement, although no state government had existed, and the region had fallen under federal control [41]. To make matters worse, Kashmir was under direct presidential rule when the same president revoked the special status of Kashmir [42].

As Article 370 disappeared, so did protests erupt, with many cities in Kashmir witnessing curfews and decrees to restrict public gatherings. Mass detentions took place, carried out under India's Public Safety Act (PSA), which allows detention for up to a year without bail or trial [43]. Following the repeal of Article 370 and thus of Kashmir's special legal status, Pakistan condemned India's decision and suspended all existing trade with India, thereby severing diplomatic ties. India defended its decision as a matter of sovereignty well within the boundaries of its territory. On top of the risk of demographic instability due to the arrival of Indian settlers, Kashmir observes rising unemployment as well as several complaints of human rights abuses against protesters and insurgents [44].

The reason for India to revoke Article 370 was that it deemed Kashmir's status to gradually spark anti-Indian sentiment among Kashmiris. Ironically enough, the move itself unleashed anti-India protests. New Delhi began to crack down on dissent by arresting protesters, shutting down communication and imprisoning journalists, politicians and human rights activists. In September 2021, one of the main Kashmiri separatist leaders Syed Ali Shah Geelani died at the age of 91 in Srinagar. Geelani was buried in secret, with the public not allowed to participate in the funeral. Another separatist leader, Yasin Malik, has been convicted on money-laundering charges and is sitting in Delhi's Tihar jail on a life sentence [45]. Pakistan has been seen by regional experts as a stable supporter to the indigenous Kashmiri movements, yet in recent years its ability and willingness to support local resistance to India has dwindled, not least due to Pakistan's internal struggles and the general distrust against armed forces following the ousting of former prime minister Imran Khan [46]. Crucially, there is room for diplomatic solutions to the dispute as the rivaling countries have shown the ability to take active measures to de-escalate and settle their differences; most recently, this translates into a 2021 agreement that saw a ceasefire along the Line of Control over which the two countries had been sporadically fighting over the last five years [47].

The sometimes overlooked stakeholder in the region is the PRC, which still holds claims to the eastern Ladakh portion of Kashmir. The PRC, despite being a third party to the dispute, holds a clear and distinct position that the Kashmir situation "should be properly managed in a peaceful way in accordance with the UN charter, relevant Security Council resolutions and relevant bilateral agreements", according to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning [48]. He further recommended "dialogue and consultations" and "avoiding taking 'unilateral actions' that could further complicate the situation" [49]. This stance has not stopped Indian prime minister Modi from taunting the Chinese presence in Kashmir on several occasions, despite India's economic links with the PRC [50]. Modi went as far as stating that "India's enemies have seen fire and fury of its armed forces" [51]. Other border disputes between the PRC and India further complicates any solution to the Kashmir dispute as the two opposing countries have had border skirmishes in the Himalayas in 2020 and 2021 over contested regions; the disputed regions can be seen in the map below [52].



Border dispute between India and China [53]

d. Past international actions

Among many others, here follows some of the UNSC resolutions concerning the Kashmir dispute that helped shape the response of the international community towards this issue over the years [54].

1. UNSCR 38 (1948) - S/RES/38

This resolution sought to de-escalate the tensions and conflicts in Kashmir by both India and Pakistan.

2. UNSCR 39 (1948) - S/RES/39

This resolution set up the UN Commission for India and Pakistan that sought to investigate the dispute.

3. UNSCR 47 (1948) - S/RES/47

This resolution sought to reform the UN Commission for India and Pakistan and provide the basis on which a free and fair plebiscite might take place.

4. UNSCR 80 (1950) - S/RES/80

This resolution decommissioned the UN Commission for India and Pakistan and imposed a programme of demilitarisation of India and Pakistan.

5. UNSCR 91 (1951) - S/RES/91

This resolution set up military observers in Kashmir to supervise the ceasefire with a mandate to observe, report, and investigate possible ceasefire violations.

6. UNSCR 98 (1952) - S/RES/98

This resolution sought to limit the troops present in Kashmir on both sides.

7. UNSCR 209 (1965) - S/RES/209

This resolution called for an immediate ceasefire in the 1965 war between Pakistan and India.

8. UNSCR 1172 (1998) - S/RES/1172

This resolution sought to resume dialogues between India and Pakistan to solve the root issues of their conflict, including the Kashmir dispute.

Some of these resolutions, particularly those in the early years, are highly consequential today with, for example, the Line of Control being set in 1948 as a short term solution [55].

e. Relevant Questions

The following questions posed should be some of the different considerations you should have as a delegate prior to the conference, in informing your position paper, and, ultimately, your contributions within the committee:

- Where did/does your country stand in terms of the Kashmir dispute? What are your long/short term objectives and outcomes you wish to see?
- Are you particularly aligned with any side of the dispute? If so, who and why?
- Has your country been a relevant actor in the Kashmir dispute? If so, to what end? How does your involvement, or lack thereof, inform your current position?
- What, if anything, is your country's position on the abrogation of article 370?
- How do you wish to ensure the current ceasefire does not degrade into yet another series of wide-scale armed conflicts?
- What solution, if any, do you propose for Kashmir?
- Should it be Kashmiris who decide on their own future political settlement? To what extent? What is the role that the UNSC and the international community are supposed to play?

5. Bibliography

a. The Libyan Peace Process

- [1] Sadalmelik. Topographic Map of Libya. Created with GMT from Public Domain GLOBE Data,. June 22, 2007. Own work. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Libya_Topography.png.
- [2] Barbour, Nevill , Fowler, Gary L. , Brown, L. Carl , Cordell, Dennis D. and Buru, Mukhtar Mustafa. „Libya“. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1 Sep. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya>. Accessed 4 September 2022.
- [3] Ibid.
- [4] Ibid.
- [5] Ibid.
- [6] “File:Map of Traditional Provinces of Libye-En.Svg - Wikipedia.” Accessed September 4, 2022. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_traditional_provinces_of_Libye-en.svg.
- [7] “Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Population Density and Distribution (10 Mar 2011) - Libya | ReliefWeb.” Accessed September 4, 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/map/libya/libyan-arab-jamahiriya-population-density-and-distribution-10-mar-2011>.
- [8] “Libya.” In The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, August 31, 2022. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/libya/#introduction>.
- [9] Brett, Michael , Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. and Warmington, Brian H.. „North Africa“. Encyclopedia Britannica, 29 Jul. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Africa>. Accessed 8 October 2022.
- [10] Ibid.
- [11] Ibid.
- [12] Ibid.
- [13] Ibid.
- [14] Ibid.
- [15] Ibid.
- [16] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Italo-Turkish War“. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 22 Sep. 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Italo-Turkish-War>. Accessed 4 September 2022.
- [17] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Sanūsiyyah“. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 31 Mar. 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sanusiyah>. Accessed 4 September 2022.
- [18] Wikipedia, Andrei nacu at English. English: The Maximum Extent of the Roman Empire. Superimposed on a Physical Map. Senatorial Provinces Imperial Provinces October 17, 2005. Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RomanEmpire_117.svg.
- [19] “Libya - History | Britannica.” Accessed September 4, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/History>.
- [20] „Libya country profile“. BBC News. 15 March 2021. Archived from the original on 6 May 2021. Retrieved 15 March 2021.
- [21] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Idris I“. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 21 May. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idris-I-king-of-Libya>. Accessed 4 September 2022.
- [22] Barbour, Nevill , Fowler, Gary L. , Brown, L. Carl , Cordell, Dennis D. and Buru, Mukhtar Mustafa. „Libya“. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1 Sep. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya>. Accessed 4 September 2022.
- [23] Schiller, Jon (29 November 2009). Internet View of the Arabic World. CreateSpace. p. 161. ISBN 9781439263266
- [24] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Idris I“. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 21 May. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idris-I-king-of-Libya>. Accessed 4 September 2022.
- [25] <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Rowanwindwhistler>. English: Kingdoms of the Maghreb in the 15th Century. December 3, 2018. This file was derived from: Magrèb sègle XV-pt.svg. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maghreb_15th_Century.svg.
- [26] RedEyedTreeFrog, AbdurRahman AbdulMoneim &. English: Map of the Senussi Order, Influence

and Surroundings in 1297 Hijri, 1880 Gregorian. December 14, 2021. Own work, primarily based on the book “ايقيرفاً يف ةيسونسلا ةكرحلا خيرات” by dr Muhammad Ali al-Salabi, and on <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b8439409s/fl.item.zoom>, and other sources for minor parts. various sources for the states around the Senussis. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Senussi_Map2.png.

[27] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Muammar al-Gaddafi“. Encyclopedia Britannica, 17 Aug. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Gaddafi>. Accessed 4 September 2022.

[28] “Libya - Political Process | Britannica.” Accessed September 4, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/Finance-and-trade>.

[29] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Muammar al-Gaddafi“. Encyclopedia Britannica, 17 Aug. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Gaddafi>. Accessed 4 September 2022.

[30] Ibid.

[31] “File:Muammar al-Gaddafi at the AU Summit.Jpg.” In Wikipedia, May 7, 2015. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Muammar_al-Gaddafi_at_the_AU_summit.jpg&oldid=661227442.

[32] „Libya: The significance of 7 April; whether it is a day on which dissidents are hanged and if this practice has been in existence since 1970“. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 7 January 2003. LBY40606.E. Archived from the original on 16 November 2019. Retrieved 16 November 2019.

[33] Guinness World Records 2008 Book. ISBN 978-1-904994-18-3

[34] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Great Man-Made River“. Encyclopedia Britannica, 26 Mar. 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Great-Man-Made-River>. Accessed 4 September 2022.

[35] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Muammar al-Gaddafi“. Encyclopedia Britannica, 17 Aug. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Gaddafi>. Accessed 4 September 2022.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] „Libyans Protest over Delayed Subsidized Housing Units“. Almasry Alyoum. 16 January 2011. Archived from the original on 22 March 2011. Retrieved 18 March 2011.

[40] Golovnina, Maria (28 February 2011). „World raises pressure on Libya, battles for key towns“. Reuters. Tripoli. Retrieved 25 January 2012.

[41] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Muammar al-Gaddafi“. Encyclopedia Britannica, 17 Aug. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Gaddafi>. Accessed 4 September 2022.

[42] “Libya: Strategy of Scorched Earth, Desire for Widespread and Systematic Elimination“ (Press release). International Federation for Human Rights. 24 February 2011. Retrieved 27 March 2011.

[43] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Muammar al-Gaddafi“. Encyclopedia Britannica, 17 Aug. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Gaddafi>. Accessed 4 September 2022.

[44] „Security Council Approves ‚No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya, Authorizing ‚All Necessary Measures‘ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions“. United Nations. 17 March 2011. Archived from the original on 24 March 2021. Retrieved 13 April 2021.

[45] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. „Muammar al-Gaddafi“. Encyclopedia Britannica, 17 Aug. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Gaddafi>. Accessed 4 September 2022.

[46] Lederer, Edith (16 September 2011). „UN approves Libya seat for former rebels“. San Jose Mercury News. Archived from the original on 23 November 2011. Retrieved 16 September 2011.

[47] Raby. English: Progress of the Libya Civil War. October 21, 2011. Own work. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Libyan_war_final.svg.

[48] „Death Toll in Libyan Popular Uprising at 10,000“. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. 24 February 2011. Archived from the original on 28 July 2011. Retrieved 5 August 2011.

[49] „Libye: „Mouammar Kadhafi avait choisi la voie suicidaire dès février““ [Libya: „Muammar Gaddafi had chosen the path of suicide in February“]. 20 minutes (in French). 20 October 2011. Archived from the original on 22 November 2011. Retrieved 11 November 2011.

[50] File:Flag of Libya (1951–1969).svg. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Libya.svg.

[51] „Libya’s NTC hands power to newly elected assembly“. BBC News. 8 August 2012. Archived from the original on 8 August 2012. Retrieved 8 August 2012

[52] Ibid.

[53] LibyaHerald. “Congress Votes to Replace Itself with New House of Representatives,” March 30, 2014.

<https://www.libyaherald.com/2014/03/congress-votes-to-replace-itself-with-new-house-of-representatives/>.

[54] Soguel, Dominique (8 July 2012), Jibril urges unity as Libya wraps up vote count, AFP, archived from the original on 15 August 2012, retrieved 11 November 2016

[55] Reuters. “Libyan Assembly Votes to Follow Islamic Law,” December 4, 2013, sec. Banks. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-law-idUSBRE9B30M220131204>.

[56] “Libya - Gaddafi Toppled and Killed | Britannica.” Accessed September 5, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/History>.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Al Arabiya English. “Libyan Dawn: Map of Allies and Enemies,” August 25, 2014. <https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2014/08/25/Libyan-Dawn-Map-of-allies-and-enemies>.

[59] “Libya - Gaddafi Toppled and Killed | Britannica.” Accessed September 5, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/History>.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Child, David. “Libya Q&A: ‘Haftar Offers a Return to a Military State.’” Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/20/qa-whats-happening-in-libya>.

[65] “AP Explains: What next after the downfall of IS in Sirte?”. Archived from the original on 2017-03-02. Retrieved 2017-03-02.

[66] „Libyan eastern-based army concludes military actions in Benghazi“. Xinhua News Agency. Archived from the original on 30 December 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2018.

[67] Balzan, Jurgen. Europe courts Libyan strongman as Russia closes in. Malta Today. Published 9 February 2017. Retrieved 4 March 2017

[68] Correspondent, John Pearson Foreign. “Russia Asserts Growing Ambitions in Middle East with Libya Talks.” The National, March 2, 2017. <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/russia-asserts-growing-ambitions-in-middle-east-with-libya-talks-1.47200>.

[70] “Libya - Gaddafi Toppled and Killed | Britannica.” Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/History>.

[71] Ibid.

[72] National, The. “El Sisi: Egypt Prepared for Military Intervention in Libya.” The National, June 21, 2020. <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/el-sisi-egypt-prepared-for-military-intervention-in-libya-1.1036439>.

[73] “UN Says Libya Sides Reach ‘Permanent Ceasefire’ Deal | Khalifa Haftar News | Al Jazeera.” Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/23/un-says-libya-sides-reach-permanent-ceasefire-deal>.

[74] „UNSMIL announces that LPDF approves the proposal of selection mechanism of executive authority for the preparatory period“. United Nations Support Mission in Libya. 19 January 2021. Archived from the original on 20 January 2021. Retrieved 20 January 2021

[75] Libya, Government of National Unity of the State of. English: Seal of the Government of National Unity of Libya. March 26, 2021. Own work, based on logo from government website. [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Seal_of_the_Government_of_National_Unity_\(Libya\).svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Seal_of_the_Government_of_National_Unity_(Libya).svg).

[76] Welle (www.dw.com), Deutsche. “Libyan Parliament Approves Unity Government | DW | 10.03.2021.” DW.COM. Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://www.dw.com/en/libyan-parliament-approves-unity-government/a-56826306>.

[77] “Libya - Gaddafi Toppled and Killed | Britannica.” Accessed September 5, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/History>.

[78] “Libya’s Parliament Passes No-Confidence Vote in Unity Government.” Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/21/libya-parliament-withdraws-confidence-from-unity-government>.

[79] “Libya - Gaddafi Toppled and Killed | Britannica.” Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/History>.

[80] magazine, Le Point. “Libye: combats à Tripoli après un coup de force du gouvernement rival.” Le Point, May 17, 2022. <https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/libye-combats-a-tripoli-apres-un-coup-de-force-du-gouverne>

ment-rival-17-05-2022-2475968_24.php.

- [81] „Libya’s PM Dbeibah proposes holding polls at end of 2022“. Daily Sabah. 26 May 2022. Retrieved 14 June 2022.
- [82] BBC News. “Libya Protesters Storm Parliament Building in Tobruk,” July 2, 2022, sec. Africa. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62018882>.
- [83] BBC News. “Libya Clashes: UN Calls for Ceasefire after 32 Killed,” August 28, 2022, sec. Africa. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62704008>.
- [84] Zifan, Ali. Deutsch: Unter Kontrolle Des Abgeordnetenrats in Tobruk Und Der Allianz Der Nationalen Kräfte. February 2016. Derived from Template:Libyan Civil War detailed map. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Libyan_Civil_War.svg.
- [85] „Libya Body Count“. Libya Body Count. December 2016. Retrieved 29 April 2021.
- [86] Safa Alharathy (1 May 2018). „4068 casualties recorded in Libya in 2017, Human Rights Solidarity reports“. The Libya Observer. Retrieved 19 January 2022.
- [87] „Human Rights Solidarity: About 4000 people were victims of armed fighting in Libya in 2018“. The Libya Observer. Retrieved 12 February 2019.
- [88] Patrick Wintour (14 January 2020). „Libyan warlord Haftar leaves Moscow without signing ceasefire deal“. The Guardian. Retrieved 19 January 2022.
- [89] „Human Rights Solidarity published the annual report on the Victims of Armed Clashes in Libya during the year 2020“. Human Rights Solidarity. 21 February 2021. Retrieved 19 January 2022.
- [90] Anderson, Jon Lee (23 February 2015). „Letter from Libya. The Unravelling“. The New Yorker. Retrieved 18 February 2015.
- [91] Salah, Maha (27 July 2019). „Trapped at the crossroads“. Zenith. Retrieved 8 August 2019.
- [92] „UNHCR: Registered migrants in Libya amounted to 45,600 from beginning of 2019 | The Libya Observer“. www.libyaobserver.ly. Retrieved 9 October 2019.
- [93] „Assistance to People Affected by the Crisis in Libya | World Food Programme“. www.wfp.org. Retrieved 9 June 2020.
- [94] „UNICEF: Children in conflict areas continue to suffer various forms of malnutrition | The Libya Observer“. www.libyaobserver.ly. Retrieved 22 October 2019.
- [95] „Tens of thousands of Libyan children at risk amidst violence and chaos of unrelenting conflict“. Libya Herald. Retrieved 19 January 2020.
- [96] “Libya Oil Reserves, Production and Consumption Statistics - Worldometer.” Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://www.worldometers.info/oil/libya-oil/>.
- [97] Ibid.
- [98] “Libya Crude Oil Production - August 2022 Data - 1973-2021 Historical.” Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://tradingeconomics.com/libya/crude-oil-production>.
- [99] “Libya’s Oil Production Recovers to Pre-Blockade Level - Bloomberg.” Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-31/libya-s-oil-production-recovers-to-pre-blockade-level?leadSource=verify%20wall>.
- [100] Reuters. “U.N. Condemns Water Shutoff to Libyan Capital,” April 10, 2020, sec. World News. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-water-idUSKCN21S250>.
- [101] Washington Post. “U.N. Slams ‘Extensive, Blatant’ Violations of Libya Arms Embargo.” Accessed September 11, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/libya-arms-embargo-un-report/2021/03/16/8ff1fca4-8678-11eb-8a67-f314e5fcf88d_story.html.
- [102] Reuters. “Italy, France Spar Over Escalating Conflict in Libya.” VOA. Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://www.voanews.com/a/italy-france-spar-over-escalating-conflict-in-libya/4871654.html>.
- [103] Mackinnon, Amy. “Russia and Turkey’s Proxy War in Libya Heats Up.” Foreign Policy (blog). Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/19/russia-and-turkeys-proxy-war-in-libya-heats-up/>.
- [104] “UNTC.” Accessed September 11, 2022. <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028056605a>.
- [105] EgyptToday. “Libyan Court Cancels Border Demarcation and Security Cooperation Agreement between Al-Wefaq and Turkey,” January 27, 2021. <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/96913/Libyan-court-cancels-border-demarcation-and-security-cooperation-agreement-between>.
- [106] UNSMIL. “Remarks of SRSG Ghassan Salamé to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation

in Libya 29 July 2019,” July 29, 2019. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/remarks-srsg-ghassan-salam%C3%A9-united-nations-security-council-situation-libya-29-july-2019>.

[107] Wintour, Patrick (2 March 2020). „Libya peace efforts thrown further into chaos as UN envoy quits“. The Guardian. Archived from the original on 7 September 2020. Retrieved 11 September 2020.

[108] Assad, Abdulkader (30 January 2020). „UN envoy to Libya briefs Security Council on violations of ceasefire“. The Libya Observer. Archived from the original on 30 January 2020. Retrieved 30 January 2020.

[109] Colitt, Raymond (14 January 2020). „Merkel Confirms Libya Conference in Berlin for January 19“. Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 15 January 2020. Retrieved 15 January 2020.

[110] Black, Ian; Smith, David (27 June 2011). „War crimes court issues Gaddafi arrest warrant“. The Guardian.

[111] „East Libyan forces say have arrested commander sought by ICC“. Reuters. 2017-08-17. Retrieved 2017-08-20.

[112] “UN Documents for Libya: Security Council Resolutions.” Accessed September 16, 2022. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-resolutions/page/1?ctype=Libya&cbtype=libya#038;cbtype=libya.

b. The Kashmir Dispute

[1] “Kashmir.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.

[2] “Kashmir Territories Profile.” BBC News, BBC, 6 Aug. 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11693674>.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “Kashmir.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] “Indian Mutiny.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., <https://www.britannica.com/event/Indian-Mutiny>.

[9] Purewal, Navtej K, and Eleanor Newbigin. “Five Myths about the Partition of British India – and What Really Happened.” The Conversation, 26 Aug. 2022, <https://theconversation.com/five-myths-about-the-partition-of-british-india-and-what-really-happened-187131>.

[10] “Kashmir.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.

[11] Kaul, Chandrika. “History - British History in Depth: From Empire to Independence: The British Raj in India 1858-1947.” BBC, BBC, 3 Mar. 2011, https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/independence1947_01.shtml.

[12] Purewal, Navtej K, and Eleanor Newbigin. “Five Myths about the Partition of British India – and What Really Happened.” The Conversation, 26 Aug. 2022, <https://theconversation.com/five-myths-about-the-partition-of-british-india-and-what-really-happened-187131>.

[13] “Partition: Why Was British India Divided 75 Years Ago?” BBC News, BBC, 14 Aug. 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-62467438>.

[14] Blakemore, Erin. “The Kashmir Conflict: How Did It Start?” Culture, 2 Mar. 2019, www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/kashmir-conflict-how-did-it-start.

[15] “Partition: Why Was British India Divided 75 Years Ago?” BBC News, BBC, 14 Aug. 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-62467438>.

[16] “Kashmir.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.

[17] Bennett, Frederic M. “None.” The Atlantic, The Atlantic, Feb. 1958, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1958/02/muslim-and-hindu/305462/.

[18] “Partition: Why Was British India Divided 75 Years Ago?” BBC News, BBC, 14 Aug. 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-62467438>.

- [19] Purewal, Navtej K, and Eleanor Newbiggin. “Five Myths about the Partition of British India – and What Really Happened.” *The Conversation*, 26 Aug. 2022, <https://theconversation.com/five-myths-about-the-partition-of-british-india-and-what-really-happened-187131>.
- [20] BBC News. “Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan Fight over It.” *BBC News*, 8 Aug. 2019, www.bbc.com/news/10537286.
- [21] *Ibid.*
- [22] *Ibid.*
- [23] *Ibid.*
- [24] History Matters. “Why Did China Invade India in 1962? (Short Animated Documentary).” YouTube, 4 Oct. 2021, www.youtube.com/watch?v=v97TzqGzbM4. Accessed 10 Dec. 2021.
- [25] *Ibid.*
- [26] Office of the Historian. “Milestones: 1961–1968 - Office of the Historian.” *State.gov*, 2019, history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war.
- [27] “Brijesh P Asked: Why Did Pakistan and under What Terms and Conditions Cede the Shaksgam Valley to China? What Is the Geo-Strategic Significance of the Valley? | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.” *Idsa.in*, idsa.in/askanexpert/ShaksgamValleytoChina.
- [28] Ghoshal, Devjyot. “Factbox: India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenals.” *Reuters*, 11 Mar. 2022, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-pakistans-nuclear-arsenals-2022-03-11/.
- [29] Office of the Historian. “Milestones: 1961–1968 - Office of the Historian.” *State.gov*, 2019, history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war.
- [30] *Ibid.*
- [31] Singh, Rajkumar. *Revisiting Indo-Pakistan Spirit of Bus Diplomacy*. 8 Mar. 2020, thekootneeti.in/2020/03/08/revisiting-indo-pakistan-spirit-of-bus-diplomacy/.
- [32] *Ibid.*
- [33] *Ibid.*
- [34] “Kargil War | India-Pakistan [1999] | Britannica.” *Www.britannica.com*, www.britannica.com/event/Kargil-War.
- [35] *www.ETAAuto.com*. “No Discussion with DTC on Resumption of Delhi-Lahore Bus Service Yet: RTI Reply - et Auto.” *ETAAuto.com*, auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/commercial-vehicle/mhcv/no-discussion-with-dtc-on-resumption-of-delhi-lahore-bus-service-yet-rti-reply/93815084?redirect=1. Accessed 1 Nov. 2022.
- [36] *Ibid.*
- [37] BBC News. “Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan Fight over It.” *BBC News*, 8 Aug. 2019, www.bbc.com/news/10537286.
- [38] *Ibid.*
- [39] BBC. “Article 370: What Happened with Kashmir and Why It Matters.” *BBC News*, 5 Aug. 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708.
- [40] *Ibid.*
- [41] *Ibid.*
- [42] Buchanan, Kelly. “FALQs: Article 370 and the Removal of Jammu and Kashmir’s Special Status | in Custodia Legis: Law Librarians of Congress.” *Blogs.loc.gov*, 3 Oct. 2019, blogs.loc.gov/law/2019/10/falqs-article-370-and-the-removal-of-jammu-and-kashmirs-special-status/.
- [43] Fareed, Rifat, and Murali Krishnan. “Kashmir: A Year of Lost Autonomy – DW – 08/04/2020.” *Dw.com*, Deutsche Welle, 4 Aug. 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/kashmir-a-year-of-lockdown-and-lost-autonomy/a-54437369>.
- [44] BBC News. “Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan Fight over It.” *BBC News*, 8 Aug. 2019, www.bbc.com/news/10537286.
- [45] Lateef, Samaan. “Life in Kashmir after Special Status Revoked – DW – 08/05/2022.” *Dw.com*, Deutsche Welle, 5 Aug. 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-life-like-in-kashmir-3-years-after-losing-special-status/a-62723397>.
- [46] Lateef, Samaan. “Pakistan: Kashmir on Back Burner amid Domestic Woes – DW – 09/08/2022.” *Dw.com*, Deutsche Welle, 6 Sept. 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/domestic-woes-force-pakistan-to-put-kashmir-on-the-back-burner/a-63032240>.

[47] “Pakistani Kashmir: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report.” Freedom House, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistani-kashmir/freedom-world/2022>.

[48] PTI. “Kashmir Issue Should Be Resolved by India, Pakistan through Dialogue, Consultations: China.” The Indian Express, 27 Oct. 2022, <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/kashmir-issue-india-pakistan-dialogue-consultations-china-8233336/>.

[49] Ibid.

[50] “PM Modi Attacks ,Expansionist‘ China from Ladakh.” Kashmir Observer, 3 July 2020, <https://kashmiroobserver.net/2020/07/03/era-of-expansionism-is-over-says-pm-modi-from-ladakh/>.

[51] “PM Modi’s Veiled Warning to Pakistan, China from Lac.” Kashmir Observer, 24 Oct. 2022, <https://kashmiroobserver.net/2022/10/24/india-has-never-considered-war-first-option-but-last-resort-pm-modi/>.

[52] Sharma, Aditya. “What Is next in the China-India Border Conflict? – DW – 01/28/2022.” Dw.com, Deutsche Welle, 28 Jan. 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-next-in-the-china-india-border-conflict/a-60586745>.

[53] Ibid.

[54] “Un Documents for Jammu and Kashmir: Security Council Resolutions.” Security Council Report, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-resolutions/page/1?ctype=Jammu%2Band%2BKashmir&cbtype=jammu-and-kashmir#038;cbtype=jammu-and-kashmir.

[55] “UN RESOLUTIONS ON JAMMU & KASHMIR.” UN Resolutions on Jammu & Kashmir - Pakistan Mission to the UN, Geneva, <https://www.pakungeneva.pk/ContentPage.aspx?ID=20>.